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Abstract 
This paper discusses the exchange rate policies in the three stages of the euro adoption process. 
In the first stage, i.e., after EU accession but before ERM II entry, the exchange rate becomes 
a matter of “common concern” according to the Treaty. The paper argues that in the modern 
conditions, this has no real meaning besides mutual consultations on macroeconomic policy 
issues. In the second stage, common concern becomes institutionalized under the ERM II me-
chanism. Its main advantages and risks are discussed, and the arguments for minimizing 
the length of this stage are presented. In the third step, the exchange rate stability criterion is 
assessed before the country is allowed to adopt the euro. The paper discusses the open issues 
in the interpretation of this criterion. Finally, the current state of the Czech euro adoption stra-
tegy is described. 
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1. Introduction  
The new EU Member States are expected to join the euro area some time in the fu-
ture. This must, however, be seen only as a final step in a continuous process rather 
than a single discrete decision. There are basically three distinct periods along the way. 
First, EU entry made exchange rate policy a matter of common concern. Second, in 
order to join the euro area the Member States are required to stay within the ERM II 
for at least two years before assessment of the convergence criteria and maintain their 
exchange rates close to the central parity. The third stage is the adoption of the euro 
after meeting the convergence criteria. 
The objective of this paper is to show that these distinct stages in the euro adop-
tion process all have their historical backgrounds. Based on these, we argue that it 
would be a mistake not to take these backgrounds into consideration when interpret-
ing the milestones that need to be met on the way to the euro. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a brief description of the de-
velopment of the exchange rate arrangements in the past several decades. In the se-
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cond part, the period before ERM II entry, in which the exchange rate is a matter of 
common concern, is studied. In the third part a discussion of the ERM II period, with 
some pros and cons of the mechanism, is provided. Assessments of the exchange rate 
convergence criterion are investigated in the fourth part. The paper concludes with 
the key points of the Czech euro adoption strategy. 
2. The Development of the Exchange Rate Arrangements 
The  exchange  rate  systems  and  the corresponding  monetary  policy  regimes 
adopted worldwide have shown diversity across countries and changing popularity 
over time. The monetary authorities have been constantly forced to evaluate what 
the optimal policy regime for their economies is, and respond to the changing en-
vironment. The Bretton Woods system, the international monetary framework after 
World War II, attempted to preserve autonomous monetary policy on the one hand 
and to preserve some of the benefits of fixed exchange rates on the other hand. 
However,  the system  exhibited  internal  conflicts;  it  was  not  flexible  enough  to 
buffer periodic shocks and not strong enough to prevail. Parities were difficult to 
negotiate, resulting in delays and too late adjustment. Eventually, the system col-
lapsed in 1971. 
Since Bretton Woods, an increasing number of countries worldwide have been 
gradually moving away from intermediate exchange rate regimes such as crawling 
pegs and soft pegs toward the ends of the spectrum, adopting either floating or hard 
pegs. This is a consequence of rising capital mobility and integration into world as-
sets and goods markets. 
Countries  that  maintain  floating  exchange  rates  against  the major  currencies 
have become the largest group during the 1990s. Fisher (2001) reports that the num-
ber of soft pegs dropped from 98 in 1991 to 63 in 1999, while flexible exchange rate 
arrangements increased from 36 to 80 over the same period (Figure 1). This trend has 
continued,  even  though  at  a slower  pace,  in  the early  years  of  this  decade.  At 
the same time, there have been efforts toward regional monetary integration, and so-
called hard peg exchange rate regimes (currency boards, dollarization, etc.) have also 
become more popular worldwide. 
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These polar regimes are tending to prevail and there appears to be no viable 
middle ground.
1 Both the de jure classification of exchange rate regimes, which fo-
cuses on the stated policy intentions of monetary authorities, and the de facto clas-
sification of exchange rate regimes based on actual movements of the exchange rate, 
support this trend. 
2.1 Exchange Rate Trends in Europe 
In Europe, the European Monetary System (EMS) was established after Bretton 
Woods in 1979. EMS was similar to Bretton Woods in declaring a central parity and 
a fluctuation band. The currencies were tied together mutually (the so-called parity 
grid) and vis-à-vis the artificially created ECU.  
Some problems resulting from the rigidity of the system remained. Moreover, 
increasing capital mobility made the system more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks 
and speculative attacks. These aspects contributed to the EMS crisis of 1992–1993. 
On the one hand, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria, and 
Denmark, countries that had established and maintained tight pegs to the German 
mark  for  a long  time  in  the ERM,  were  able  to  defend  the parity.  On  the other 
hand, speculative pressures led to the withdrawal of Italy and the United Kingdom 
from the ERM and to exchange rate devaluations in Spain, Ireland, and Portugal. 
Finland and Sweden, which were not formally in the ERM, were forced to abandon 
their pegs. The EMS as such remained in place, but its practical functioning was 
substantially modified by a widening of the fluctuation band to ±15 %. Ultimately, 
it  was only the formation of the euro area in 1999 that removed the risk of ex-
change rate crises and excessive exchange rate volatility among the participating 
countries.  
The exchange rate arrangements of the new EU Member States are summarized 
in the Table 1. Among the twelve new Member States, five pursued hard pegs or 
narrow bands before their EU entry (the Baltic states, Malta and Bulgaria), another 
five operated under flexible exchange rates, and only two countries (Hungary and 
Cyprus) had intermediate regimes.
2 Thus, the polar regimes also dominated among 
the new Member States before the EU enlargement. Since then, the major changes 
have consisted in ERM II entry by seven countries, one of which (Slovenia) had al-
ready adopted the euro. The first wave comprised Estonia, Lithuania, and Slovenia at 
the end of June 2004. However, Estonia and Lithuania have unilaterally retained their 
currency  board  arrangement.  The second  wave  was  Latvia,  Cyprus,  and  Malta  in 
May 2005, who have also kept their unilateral exchange rate commitments. Finally, 
Slovakia joined in November 2005; it is the only ERM II country without any other 
commitment than the standard ±15% fluctuation band. 
1 There are, however, opponents of this mainstream view. Williamson (2000) is one of the exam-
ples, arguing in favor of the intermediate options (the so-called “basket, band and crawl” sys-
tem). Some recent literature also argues in favor of managed floating (e.g. (Bofinger, Woll-
mershaeuser, 2001), (Goldstein, 2002), (Frankel, 1999), (Fischer, 2001)). 
2 It should be noted, though, that the Slovenian managed floating de facto mimicked a crawl-
ing peg arrangement until ERM II entry and a very narrow fixed peg from ERM II entry until 
euro adoption. TABLE 1  Monetary Policy Strategies of New EU Member States 
  Monetary policy strategy  Currency  Features 
Bulgaria  Exchange rate target  Bulgarian lev  Currency board pegged to the euro introduced in 1997. 
Cyprus  Exchange rate target  Cyprus pound  ERM II participation since 2 May 2005 with a ±15% fluctuation band, de facto 
close to the central parity. Euro adoption in 2009. 
Czech Republic  Inflation targeting  Czech koruna  Target set at 3 % (±1 p.p.), lowered to 2 % (±1 p.p.) from January 2010. Managed 
floating of the exchange rate. 
Estonia  Exchange rate target  Estonian kroon  ERM II participation since 28 June 2004 with a ±15% fluctuation band. Currency 
board to the euro introduced in 1992, maintained as a unilateral commitment. 
Hungary   Combined exchange rate 
and inflation target  Hungarian forint 
Exchange rate target: peg to the euro with a ±15% fluctuation band. Inflation 
target: 3.5 % (±1 p.p.) by end-2006, and 3 % (±1 p.p.) medium-term target 
from 2007. 
Latvia  Exchange rate target  Latvian lat  ERM II participation since 2 May 2005 with a ±15% fluctuation band. Fluctuation 
band of ±1% as a unilateral commitment. 
Lithuania  Exchange rate target  Lithuanian litas  ERM II participation since 28 June 2004. Currency board to the euro introduced 
in 1994, maintained as a unilateral commitment.  
Malta  Exchange rate target  Maltese lira  ERM II participation since 2 May 2005 with a ±15% fluctuation band. De facto at 
the central parity as a unilateral commitment. Euro adoption in 2009. 
Poland  Inflation targeting  Polish zloty  Inflation target: 2.5 % (±1 p.p.; yearly average) as from 2004. Free floating 
of the exchange rate 
Romania  Inflation targeting  Romanian leu  Inflation target: 4 % and 3.8 % (±1 p.p.) for end-2007 and 2008, respectively. 
Managed floating of the exchange rate. 
Slovakia  Inflation targeting under ERM II  Slovak koruna 
ERM II participation since 25 November 2005 with a ±15% fluctuation band. 
The inflation target for 2006-2008 is set below 2.5 % for end-2006 and below 2 % 
at end-2007 and at end-2008. 
Slovenia  Member of eurozone  
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3. The Exchange Rate as a Matter of Common Concern 
The advent of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) brought new chal-
lenges  for  monetary  policy  and  the corresponding  exchange  rate  arrangements. 
The Treaty provided the legal basis for taking pre-specified steps to form the EMU, 
committing all Member States except the UK and Denmark, which negotiated opt- 
-out clauses, to an irreversible process towards single currency adoption.  
The Treaty provides that EMU is to be achieved in three stages. In the first stage 
(1990–1993), free movement of capital between Member States, closer coordination 
of economic policies, and closer cooperation between central banks was attained. 
The second stage (1994–1998) aimed at promoting the convergence of the economic 
and monetary policies of the Member States to ensure price stability and sound pub-
lic finances. In the third stage (from 1999), the European Central Bank (ECB) was 
established, the Member States’ exchange rates were irrevocably fixed, and the single 
currency, the euro, was introduced. 
Nonetheless, the procedures of the Treaty, which were originally designed for 
creating the monetary union in the context of the EMS, are also to be applied to 
the enlargement of the euro area under the quite different circumstances that now pre-
vail in the exchange rate arrangements. As we shall see below, this raises some open 
issues, and has led many economists and policy makers to call for a flexible inter-
pretation of the procedures. 
3.1 The Exchange Rate as a Common Concern in Polar Regimes 
The twelve EU newcomers are the first countries to have entered the EU after 
the single currency was introduced. Upon their accession, they thus became Member 
States of the EMU with a derogation from euro adoption. They are thus required to 
implement policies aiming at future euro area entry. 
In principle, it should be possible for the new Member States to bring in with 
them their existing exchange rate regimes. However, under Article 124 of the Treaty, 
the new Member States are required to treat their exchange rates as a “matter of com-
mon concern”. The single market should not be endangered by excessive nominal 
exchange rate fluctuations, which would disrupt trade flows between Member States. 
In order to protect the smooth functioning of the Single Market, competitive devalua-
tions are not allowed. 
It is, however, not straightforward to say what the “common concern” clause 
means in the current situation. It was clear under a multilateral soft-peg exchange 
rate regime such as the EMS. The aim was to avoid unilateral actions by national 
authorities, actions for which there was otherwise ample room (devaluations, mone-
tary and fiscal policy actions incompatible with maintaining the exchange rate system, 
etc.), and which could destabilize the whole system with negative consequences for all 
participants. The shift towards either free-floating or hard-pegs, though, brings challen-
ges in the interpretation of common concern.  
In  countries  with  free  floating,  usually  combined  with  an inflation  targeting 
regime, no specific “exchange rate” policy is applied. There is thus limited scope for 
coordination or indeed common concern in this regard. In practice, it is true that 
inflation targeting countries often do manage the exchange rate to some extent. They Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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try to avoid sudden swings in the exchange rate in either direction, as in small open 
economies these swings could push the inflation rate out of the desired target range. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that policy responds only to excess exchange rate volatility 
and fundamentally unjustified trends, it can hardly be compared to the competitive 
devaluations of the past.  
Similarly, for the hard peg countries the practical meaning of common concern 
is  fairly  limited.  Competitive  devaluations  are  absent  from  hard  peg  regimes  by 
definition, in order to enhance the credibility of such regimes. This fact was – quite 
naturally given the historical context – not fully accommodated and acknowledged 
when the chapters on common concern regarding the exchange rate were formulated. 
Hence, the “common concern” clause has limited practical meaning in the cur-
rent circumstances, besides mutual consultations on exchange rate and other policy 
issues.  
As Member States with a derogation, the new countries participate in such con-
sultations within the EU and ESCB institutional framework. Such coordination in 
general concerns all economic policies, which are expected to work towards fulfill-
ment  of  the convergence  criteria,  not  just  the exchange  rate  criterion.  However, 
the choice of monetary and exchange rate strategy is, until the third stage of the mo-
netary integration process, primarily the responsibility and prerogative of the Mem-
ber States concerned. 
4. ERM II Membership 
The convergence criteria introduced by the Treaty (see Box 1), which the Mem-
ber States are required to fulfill in order to be allowed to join the euro area, are meant 
to act as some form of “club rules”. They protect the current members from possible 
distractions caused by the misbehavior of other club members, in particular the new-
BOX 1  The Convergence Criteria 
 
The criterion on price stability requires that a Member State has a price performance that is 
sustainable and an average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year before the exa-
mination, that does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three best 
performing Member States in terms of price stability. 
The  exchange  rate  convergence  criterion  requires  participation  for  at  least  two  years  in 
the ERM  II  and  observance  of  the normal  fluctuation  margins  close  to  the central  parity 
provided  for  by  the mechanism  without  severe  tensions  for  at  least  two  years  and  without 
devaluation of the central rate. 
The criterion on long-term interest rates requires that, observed over a period of one year before 
the examination, a Member State has had an average nominal long-term interest rate that does 
not exceed by more than 2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member 
States in terms of price stability. 
The criterion on the government budgetary position means that a Member State has a ratio of 
planned or actual government deficit to GDP that does not exceed 3 %. 
The criterion on government debt means that a Member State has a ratio of government debt to 
GDP that does not exceed 60 %. Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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comers. The emphasis on nominal criteria reflected the view that the EMU would not 
be viable if some degree of nominal convergence was not attained prior to the intro-
duction of the single currency. The absence of a sufficient degree of prior nominal 
convergence would create a major source of instability and pose a risk to the cre-
dibility of the price stability objective of the ECB. 
4.1 The Features of ERM II 
In the ERM II stage, the “common concern” for exchange rate developments be-
comes formalized. There are requirements and procedures that have to be fulfilled 
jointly by the Member States and the EU institutions. These include the determina-
tion  of  the central  parity  and  fluctuation  margins  upon  entry  into  the mechanism, 
coordinated  interventions  should  the margins  be  reached,  and  joint  agreement  on 
possible adjustments of the central parity in the ERM II.  
The ERM II was established by a European Council Resolution of 16 June 1997 
as a successor arrangement to the EMS and ERM. The mechanism is based on fixing 
the participating currencies against the euro within a fluctuation band. Each country 
participating in the ERM II has a defined central rate (parity) against the euro and 
a fluctuation band for movements around the central rate. For the standard fluctuation 
band a ±15 % margin applies. In the event of exchange rate pressures, both the na-
tional  central  bank  and  the ECB  will  intervene  to  keep  the exchange  rate  within 
the fluctuation band. The interventions are in principle automatic and unlimited at 
the margins, but they should not endanger the price stability of the euro area. 
Maintenance of exchange rate stability, required for meeting the exchange rate 
convergence criterion, is closely linked to the ERM II. However, as described in 
more detail in the following part, the two terms are not interchangeable. While par-
ticipation  in  the ERM  II  is  a necessary  condition  for  fulfilling  the exchange  rate 
stability criterion, it is possible for a country to participate in the ERM II and yet not 
fulfill, or even be heading towards fulfilling, the exchange rate convergence criterion.  
Participation in the mechanism is voluntary, but Member States with a deroga-
tion  are  expected  to  join  the mechanism.  Greece  and  Denmark  participated  as  of 
the start of the mechanism on 1 January 1999. Greece, however, joined the euro area 
on 1 January 2001. On the other hand, Sweden and the UK have not applied for ERM 
II participation. Denmark thus remains the only “old” EU country currently partici-
pating in the ERM II, together with the above-mentioned six new EU Member States.  
4.2 Advantages and Potential Challenges of ERM II 
According to the EU institutions, the ERM II should help to ensure that Member 
States outside the euro area participating in the mechanism direct their policies to-
wards stability, fostering economic convergence. The mechanism should thus provi-
de those Member States with a reference for their conduct of sound economic poli-
cies. At the same time, the mechanism aims at protecting Member States from un-
warranted pressures in the foreign exchange markets.  
This view of the advantages of the ERM II is certainly justified by the historical 
experience of some current euro area members. At the same time, though, it may not 
fully reflect the recent exchange rate regime developments. The ERM II can be Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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classed under the label of intermediate regimes, which have received a lot of cri-
ticism recently. As we have argued, the current consensus is that macroeconomic 
stability can be achieved better and more safely with polar exchange rate regimes. 
This argument may be even stronger for transition economies, which are subject to 
large inflows of foreign capital, which, in turn, may make a soft peg regime even 
harder to sustain.  
Moreover, the standard fluctuation band of ±15 % permits substantial exchange 
rate volatility, so it is also questionable to what extent the role of the ERM II is suf-
ficiently  stabilizing.  It  needs  to  be  combined  with  another  nominal  anchor  for 
the economy, such as an inflation target. This, however, may lead to multiplicity and 
mutual inconsistency of monetary policy targets, harming the credibility of the over-
all policy framework. Moreover, the multilateral character of the ERM II, referring 
mainly to the possible participation of the ECB in interventions at the ±15% margin, 
is in practice very much limited by the very short term financing (VSTF) facility. 
Thus  for  transition  economies,  and  in  the current  situation,  there  seems  to  be  no 
value, or very limited value, added by the ERM II. 
That is why most of the new Member States have declared in their euro adop-
tion strategies an intention to stay in the ERM II for the shortest required period of 
two years (plus the period necessary for the political and logistical procedures lead-
ing to euro adoption). By doing so, they aim to fully exploit a major advantage of 
the ERM II compared to other soft peg regimes, namely, a clear exit point in the form 
of euro adoption.
3 A smooth transition through the ERM II could also be facilitated 
by progress in structural and cyclical convergence and necessary reforms in the new 
Member States. On the EU institutions’ part, a flexible approach to the interpretation 
of the exchange rate stability criterion (see below) could be a major contribution to 
coping with the ERM II stage under the new circumstances. 
5. Assessments of the Exchange Rate Convergence Criterion 
The exchange rate criterion is defined, in accordance with Article 3 of Protocol 
No. 21 (ex 6) of the Treaty, as follows: “The criterion on participation in the Ex-
change  Rate  Mechanism  of  the European  Monetary  System  […]  shall  mean  that 
a Member State has respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions 
for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State 
shall not have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other Mem-
ber State’s currency on its own initiative for the same period.” 
The  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  (ERM)  underlying  the European  Monetary 
System (EMS) was based on bilateral parities among the participating countries, with 
bilateral “normal” fluctuation margins of ±2.25 % around the central bilateral rate for 
a number of currencies and “wide” margins of ±6 % for the other Member States. 
Before the 1993 ERM crisis, the prevailing ±2.25% fluctuation bands provided a yard-
3 The Baltic states, however, have been forced to postpone euro adoption beyond their original 
target dates, mainly due to adverse inflation developments. This means that ERM II partici-
pation in these countries will exceed the required minimum period. Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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stick for interpreting the exchange rate criterion. However, because of the widening 
of the bands to ±15 % prompted by the crisis, the interpretation of the criterion be-
came less clear cut. Thus, the formulation about normal fluctuation margins without 
severe tensions has given rise to alternative but not necessarily conflicting practices 
when interpreting the criterion. 
Article 121 of the Treaty stipulates that both the European Commission and 
the European  Monetary  Institute  (the  predecessor  of  the ECB)  are  to  examine 
the state of convergence of the Member States. These convergence reports are then to 
be  submitted  to  the Council  of  the EU,  which,  based  on  the recommendation  of 
the European Commission, judges whether a given country fulfils the necessary con-
ditions for euro adoption. The decision on the 11 Member States ready to participate 
in  the single  currency  was  based  on  the first  two  convergence  reports  issued  by 
the Commission and the European Monetary Institute in 1998. In accordance with 
Article  122(2)  of  the Treaty,  at  least  once  every  two  years,  or  at  the request  of 
a Member State with a derogation, the Commission and the ECB shall release a new 
convergence report. The reports draw on the previous reports. Thus, the convergence 
reports of 1998 are the most instructive, since they were the launching reports cover-
ing the first wave of euro area participants. 
An important difference exists here between the responsibility of the European 
Commission and that of the ECB. Although both institutions are required to prepare 
convergence reports when a given country is analyzed to see whether it complies 
fully with the convergence criteria, it is the European Commission that makes the di-
rect recommendation to the Council. 
It is interesting to analyze how the convergence reports prepared by the two EU 
institutions interpret the convergence criteria. In accordance with the equal treatment 
principle, the way the criteria  were interpreted in the past  would also strongly in-
fluence how they would be applied to the new euro area acceding countries. This is 
confirmed by item 8 of the statement of the ECOFIN meeting held in April 2003: 
“The  assessment  of  the fulfilment  of  the Maastricht  convergence  criteria  [...]  will 
ensure equal treatment between future Member States and the current participants in 
the euro area.” 
5.1 Positions of the EMI/ECB and the European Commission 
The ECB in its convergence reports considered a currency stable if it had been 
traded close to its unchanged central parity. Whether or not there had been severe 
tensions on the foreign exchange market was assessed on so-called tension indicators 
such as exchange rate volatility, short-term interest rate differentials, and the extent 
of exchange market interventions.  
The practice of the European Commission was different and much more explicit 
than that of the EMI and ECB. According to its convergence report of 1998, the wi-
dening of the fluctuations margins was originally meant to be transitory to prevent 
the collapse of the ERM. At the same time, the report also acknowledges that wider 
bands should somehow be accounted for during the convergence assessment, as no 
officially announced return to the ±2.25 % occurred. As a result, the European Com-
mission introduced the so-called median currency, which was defined as the currency 
whose  deviation  from  its  ECU  central  parity  was  the “median”  deviation  among Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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the participating currencies. For the exchange rate criterion to be fulfilled, a given 
currency’s exchange rate to  the median currency’s bilateral parity should be  kept 
within a fluctuation band of ±2.25 %.  
The asymmetry of the exchange rate convergence criterion stated in the Treaty 
is reflected on page 153 of the European Commission’s 1998 Convergence Report: 
“[...] it seems reasonable to exclude movements above the 2.25% range against 
the median currency as a possible cause for non-fulfilment of the criterion.” The ap-
plication of the exchange rate convergence criterion, like that of the other conver-
gence  criteria,  in  the subsequent  reports  has  been  on  the same  basis  as  in  1998. 
Hence, the fluctuation band around the median currency is 2.25 % on the weaker side 
and much wider – perhaps up to 15 % – on the stronger side. The criterion is silent on 
revaluation of the central parity though. 
Different assessments have also been  made concerning the duration of ERM 
participation.  Finland  and  Italy  entered  and  re-entered  the ERM  in  October  and 
November 1996, respectively. At the time of the assessment in March 1998, both of 
them had spent less than two years in the ERM. The EMI took into consideration 
their respective 16.5 and 15 month stays as the reference period for examining ex-
change rate stability, whereas the European Commission treated the two countries as 
if they had spent 24 months in the ERM by examining their exchange rates between 
March 1996 and February 1998. 
Depreciation against the central parity beyond the ±2.25% limit was observed 
for two countries (France and Ireland), if the EMI reference period applied to Finland 
and Italy is considered. However, if the 24-month period for Finland and Italy is 
considered, as done by European Commission, four countries deviated by more than 
2.25 % on the weaker side. As a matter of fact, all these deviations occurred at the be-
ginning of the examination period. This was reflected by both the EMI and the Eu-
ropean Commission concluding that the criteria had been fulfilled. 
On the stronger side, the exchange rate appreciated by up to 10% against the cen-
tral parity in Finland, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Denmark. The asymmetry in 
the assessment applied and the convergence criteria were met. 
Since the convergence criteria are part of the Treaty, they can only be changed 
by renegotiating the Treaty. However, the evaluation of the extent to which the cri-
teria are met should not be understood as a purely mechanical verification of certain 
conditions. There is a lot of room for discretion in the interpretation of the criteria, 
which can have both positive and negative aspects. The discretion is partly con-
strained  by  the equal  treatment  principle,  which  should  not,  however,  come  at 
the cost of applying sound economic logic. 
Specifically in terms of the exchange rate criterion, it is important not to dwell 
on the semantic difference between the “normal” and “standard” fluctuation range. 
Instead, it should be acknowledged that the trend real exchange rate appreciation 
observed in many catching-up economies may lead to pressures above the 2.25% 
band. Yet, it is in line with economic fundamentals and should thus not be auto-
matically categorized as inconsistent with fulfilling the criterion. 
The ECB in its policy position of December 2003 points out that the assessment 
of exchange rate stability against the euro will focus on the exchange rate being close 
to the central rate while also taking into account factors that may have led to an ap-Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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preciation, which is in line with what was done in the past. The ECB further stresses 
that the width of the fluctuation band within the ERM II will not prejudice the as-
sessment of the exchange rate stability criterion. Moreover, the issue of the absence 
of “severe tensions” is, according to the ECB, addressed by examining the degree of 
deviation of exchange rates from the ERM II central rates against the euro, by using 
indicators such as  short-term interest rate differentials  vis-à-vis the euro area and 
their evolution, and by considering the role played by foreign exchange interventions. 
6. Czech Euro Adoption Strategy 
A potential conflict may arise between inflation and exchange rate objectives for 
an inflation targeting economy. This conflict may be a crucial factor in searching for 
the optimal conduct of monetary policy prior to euro adoption. It is also critical in de-
ciding on the timing of ERM II entry and euro adoption.  
The severity of this conflict is the higher the lower is the degree of economic 
convergence to the EU. An aligned economy with synchronized cycles could in prin-
ciple achieve a stable exchange rate even under inflation targeting with very limited 
direct exchange rate management. Similarly, an exchange rate targeting country could 
accommodate domestic inflation and meet the convergence criteria with a high de-
gree of convergence. 
An additional challenge stems from the asymmetry in the convergence criteria. 
An asymmetric shock pushing inflation above the inflation reference value induces 
a monetary tightening in inflation targeting countries. This exerts pressure for an ap-
preciation  of  the exchange  rate,  directing  inflation  back  to  the target.  Since  on 
the strong side the wide fluctuation band applies, inflation targeting accommodates 
such shocks safely. However, if an asymmetric shock reduces inflation, symmetric 
inflation  targeting  directs  inflation  up  by  decreasing  the interest  rate.  This  may 
induce  depreciation  pressures  and  the inflation  targeting  country  might  have  to 
intervene in order to meet the exchange rate criterion. This could be treated as severe 
tensions. Moreover, it would make the communication of monetary policy confusing. 
On  the contrary,  hard  peg  countries  could  find  it  difficult  to  cope  with  shocks 
pushing the inflation rate upward but not downward, due to the asymmetric nature of 
the inflation criterion. 
6.1 Joint Document 
The  Czech  euro  adoption  strategy  released  in  2003  as  a joint  document  of 
the Czech Government and the Czech National Bank reflected these concerns. The do-
cument recommends that the Czech Republic join the euro area as soon as economic 
conditions allow for doing so, implying that the timing depends to a large extent on 
the degree of alignment and on the nominal convergence process. 
The strategy also included an indicative euro adoption target date. In particular, 
it stated: “Provided that the Maastricht criteria are fulfilled, including a successful 
consolidation of public finances, a sufficient level of real convergence is achieved 
and adequate progress is made with structural reforms guaranteeing sufficient eco-
nomic alignment with the EU Member States, the Czech Republic can be expected to 
join the euro area around 2009–2010.” Antal, Holub: Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption 
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Given the challenges for inflation targeting countries, the euro adoption strategy 
regarded the ERM II merely as the gateway to joining the euro area, aiming to mi-
nimize  participation  in  this  mechanism  to  a period  of  two  years  (plus  the period 
necessary for assessment of the convergence criteria and logistical preparation for 
euro adoption). Therefore, the decision on the timing of entry hinges on the outlook 
for the fulfillment of the convergence criteria and on the evaluation of the Czech eco-
nomy’s degree of alignment with the euro area economies. In other words, the stra-
tegy stated that the Czech Republic should enter the ERM II only after conditions 
have been established which enable it to introduce the euro at the time of the as-
sessment of the exchange rate criterion, which is two years after joining the ERM II. 
To assess progress in these areas and give recommendations on ERM II entry, 
the strategy introduced a regular yearly assessment of the fulfillment of the Maas-
tricht criteria, as well as of economic alignment with the eurozone. None of these 
assessments in 2004–2006 resulted in a positive recommendation on ERM II entry. 
Fiscal deficits were identified as a major obstacle to future fulfillment of the conver-
gence criteria, as well as a problem for the future smooth functioning of the Czech 
economy in the euro area, given the absence of cyclical alignment with the monetary 
union. The assessments also pointed to the low flexibility of the Czech economy, and 
in particular of the labor market. 
The negative recommendation on ERM II entry in 2006 implies that the future 
euro adoption date has shifted beyond the year 2010. This means that the original euro 
adoption strategy has not been fulfilled, at least as regards the timing of euro adoption. 
The strategy has thus been put on a review, which should be finished by August 2007. 
The results of this review are not yet public. It is clear, though, that the updated strategy 
should once again emphasize the need for consolidated fiscal policy and a well-func-
tioning labor market as factors of key importance for the future smooth functioning of 
the economy within the ERM II and after the subsequent introduction of the euro.  
Entry into the euro area will complete the process of integration into European 
monetary structures. The Czech Republic will be able to participate fully in formu-
lating  and  implementing  the single  European  monetary  and  exchange  rate  policy, 
which aims at strengthening macroeconomic stability in Europe. 
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